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ABSTRACT
This article aims to assess the impact of the New Guideline of the Brazilian Accounting Pronouncements Committee 
(Comitê de Pronunciamentos Contábeis – OCPC 07) on improving formal features (size, readability, and specificity) of 
Brazilian companies’ Notes. OCPC 07 is one of the world’s first guidelines issued in response to the current demand for the 
downsizing of companies’ Notes, which according to standard setters and market agents have become too extensive, thus 
characterizing a disclosure overload. This is a unique study on the subject. The results suggest the effectiveness, although 
limited, of the new standard in promoting a departure from the habits of secrecy and formalism rooted in centuries of legal-
accounting civil law tradition, and indicate that there is still room for complementary improvement initiatives in the form of 
incentives for firms and increased enforcement. Three complementary methodological approaches are used: (1) an analysis 
of both the evolution of note size after OCPC 07 and the factors explaining that size and its variation; (2) an examination 
of indicators of readability, conciseness, and specificity of the note on accounting policies; and (3) a size comparison of the 
Notes of Brazilian and British companies, a benchmark of the common law tradition. An average reduction of 10% in Note 
size was found two years after the introduction of Guideline (Orientação) 07 by the (OCPC 07). This downsizing was not 
generalized, but instead identified only among firms in the Novo Mercado and among those audited by two of the Big Four. 
Even in firms that reduced their notes by at least 20%, no significant improvements in readability levels could be perceived, 
nor in habits of copy-pasting the auditors’ templates, which could signal a focus on firms’ real practices in the note on 
accounting policies. Brazilian Notes remain far from the benchmark and are still 40% longer than British ones, despite an 
equivalent number of pages being expected.
Keywords: OCPC 07, notes, financial statements, downsizing, readability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the adoption of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Brazil, in 2010, their 
assimilation by companies has revealed a dichotomy 
to researchers. On one hand, the benefits of IFRS are 
well-known, being rooted in the Anglo-American 
common law tradition and prioritizing essence over 
form and promoting information transparency for 
the investor, thus increasing the comparability and 
visibility of companies in the global capital market 
(Ball 2006; Gray, 1988; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). On the 
other hand, the disclosure required by IFRS appears 
to not yet satisfactorily integrate company practices, 
especially in countries with the civil law tradition, such 
as Brazil, where the secrecy and formalism that have 
shaped their institutions over the centuries still persist 
(Daske, Hail, Leuz & Verdi, 2013; Nobes, 2013; Santos, 
Ponte & Mapurunga, 2014b). This tension between 
the acceptance of the international norms per se 
(convergence de jure) and their effective materialization 
in companies’ real practices (convergence de facto) has 
created the phenomenon of disclosure overload (IFRS, 
2013): Notes inflated by long-winded texts, including 
literal copies of the norm, but lacking relevant and 
required content.
In fact, after IFRS, an increase in Note size has been 
observed: the European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group (EFRAG, 2012) mentions that the reports of 
one big pharmaceutical company had become six times 
longer since 1990; the Brazilian Social and Economic 
Development Bank (BNDES) increased the size of its 
Notes by 100% with IFRS (Martins, 2011).
Nonetheless, Santos et al. (2014b) found only a 34% 
degree of compliance with the disclosure required by 
IFRS in its first year of adoption in Brazil. Also, a study 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the 
adoption of IFRS in 183 companies in the world finds that
many companies did not appear to provide sufficient detail 
or clarity in their accounting policy disclosures to support an 
investor’s understanding of the financial statements, including 
in areas they determined as having the most significant impact 
on the amounts recognized in the financial statements. (SEC, 
2011, p. 2)
This phenomenon of lengthy Notes that are hard to 
read and lack relevant information has been of concern to 
regulatory bodies and given rise to demands around the 
world for them to be lean, relevant, and readable (EFRAG, 
2012; FASB, 2012; IFRS, 2013; SEC, 2011). 
In fact, the literature confirms the importance of the 
readability of financial reports for the capital market: 
greater readability is positively associated with company 
returns (Subramanian, Insley & Blackwel, 1993), it 
reduces analyst forecasting errors (Lehavy, Li & Merkley, 
2011), decreases the cost of capital (Dempsey, Harrison, 
Luchtenberg & Seiler, 2010), increases liquidity in the 
market (Choudhary, Schiotzer & Sturges, 2013; Miller, 
2010), and reduces costs and agency conflicts (Hui & 
Matsunaga, 2015).
In light of this global discussion and studies indicating 
disclosure shortcomings in Brazil, in a world-first initiative, 
in September of 2014 the Accounting Pronouncements 
Committee published Guideline 07 (OCPC 07), taking 
effect from 2015 and emphasizing that “only information 
relevant and specific to the entity should be disclosed” 
(OCPC 07, item 30).
Along the same lines, in December of 2014, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
published the Disclosure Initiative (Amendments to IAS 
1), taking effect in 2016 and stressing that “(1) information 
should not be obscured […] by providing immaterial 
information, (2) materiality considerations apply to all parts 
of the financial statements, and (3) even when a standard 
requires a specific disclosure, materiality considerations 
do apply”.
In this context, this study aims to answer the following 
main question: after the first two years of OCPC 07 being 
in effect (2014, 2015), was there an improvement in formal 
aspects (size, readability, and specificity) of Brazilian 
companies’ Notes?
This general question divides into six specific questions: 
(1) Did the size of Brazilian companies’ Notes decrease? (2) 
What factors explain the size of Brazilian companies’ Notes? 
(3) If there was a reduction in Note size, what factors would 
explain this reduction? (4) Was there an improvement 
in readability? (5) Was the undesired practice of simply 
copy-pasting generic texts from the norms overcome? (6) 
In order to exemplify, how does the new size of Brazilian 
companies’ Notes compare with those of British companies, 
considered a benchmark for transparency? 
No other study was found that has investigated these 
questions.
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Disclosure Theory and Disclosure Overload
The literature on disclosure focuses on the tension 
between the advantages of transparency and the 
advantages of secrecy (Verrecchia, 2001) in business. 
Investors demand the disclosure of both good and 
bad company news, as a factor of safety, credibility, 
and risk-avoidance (Dye, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001; 
Verrecchia, 2001). The greater the transparency, the 
greater the company’s attractiveness to the investor, 
reflected in a reduction in the cost of capital (Lambert, 
Leuz & Verrecchia, 2011, Verrecchia, 2001), in greater 
liquidity of shares (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991) and in 
higher accuracy of analysts’ forecasts (Eaton, Nofsinger 
& Weaver, 2007; Santos, Silva, Sheng & Lora, 2016). After 
investment, transparency is a condition for overcoming 
agency conflicts between shareholders and managements 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001).
However, various authors have observed that companies 
resist disclosure to protect owner confidentiality in face 
of competitors, hostile investors, legal disputes, and 
employees demands (Dye, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). 
Less disclosure, however, leads to “adverse selection” 
by confusing good and bad firms (Akerlof, 1970), thus 
making mandatory disclosure a public good, enhancing 
market efficiency (Healy & Palepu, 2001). The recent 
globally discussed phenomenon of disclosure overload 
– an excessive volume of non-relevant, generic (non 
firm specific), and difficult to read information – can 
therefore be understood as a new form of non-disclosure 
and resistance to disclosure.
2.2 Disclosure and Legal-Accounting Tradition
The literature distinguishes between two basic 
accounting system traditions: in Anglo-American 
influenced countries, the common law legal and 
accounting tradition prioritizes free initiative and the 
investor market, adopts distinct accounting practices 
for company management and tax purposes, and values 
those that best reflect companies’ economic reality, 
encouraging transparency and disclosure; countries with 
a continental European civil law influence emphasize 
legalism and accounting formalism, with a focus on tax 
authorities and creditors and a tendency for secrecy, 
which does not encourage transparency and disclosure 
(Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Gray, 1988; Hope, 
2003; Zarzeski, 1996).
With the global adoption of IFRS emerging from the 
common law tradition, its assimilation has been studied, 
especially in countries with a civil law tradition, such as 
Brazil. In fact, studies have confirmed that expressive 
differences remain in the levels of disclosure between 
companies with different accounting traditions, even after 
IFRS adoption (Glaum, Schmidt, Street & Vogel, 2013; 
Nobes, 2013). For example, Santos, Schiozer, and Ponte 
(2016) verified that companies from the England disclose, 
on average, 34% more required information about related 
parties than Brazilian companies. Comparing the Notes 
of telecommunications firms, Lourenço (2013) observes 
that in 44 pages the British company Vodafone manages 
to provide more relevant information for the user than 
Portugal Telecom in 125 pages. Thus, for the purposes 
of this study, it could be conjectured that Brazilian firms’ 
Notes tend to be longer and more inflated than those of 
British companies. 
2.3 Disclosure and Readability
As mentioned, one form of non-disclosure is 
characterized by obscure and difficult to read Notes that 
hide relevant information (EFRAG, 2012).
In 1998, the SEC already identified the need for greater 
clarity of language in reports, especially for the small 
investor, in the program Plain English (SEC, 1998) – How 
to create clear SEC disclosure documents, prefaced by 
Warren Buffet, which observes that a lack of clarity can 
be intentional in order to conceal information. 
For more than forty years, I’ve studied the documents that public 
companies file. Too often, I’ve been unable to decipher just what 
is being said or, worse yet, had to conclude that nothing was 
being said […] There are several possible explanations as to 
why I and others sometimes stumble over an accounting note or 
indenture description. Maybe we simply don’t have the technical 
knowledge to grasp what the writer wishes to convey. Or perhaps 
the writer doesn’t understand what he or she is talking about. 
In some cases, moreover, I suspect that a less-than scrupulous 
issuer doesn’t want us to understand a subject it feels legally 
obligated to touch upon (SEC, 1998, p. 1) 
Various studies have examined the correlation between 
clarity of disclosure, compliance with standards, and 
market perception. Choudhary et al. (2013) examine, 
in compliance with the SEC, the relationship between 
completeness, timeliness, and readability of disclosure. 
Dempsey et al. (2010) verify that the opacity (low 
readability) of reports, in avoiding bad news, conceals 
Edilene Santana Santos, Laura Calixto & Maira Ferreira Bispo
61R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 30, n. 79, p. 58-72, jan./abr. 2019
the performance of companies and increases their cost of 
capital. Subramanian et al. (1993) study the relationship 
between performance and the readability of disclosure, 
concluding that profitable companies present clearer texts 
than non-profitable ones. Li (2008) concludes that the 
reports of firms with lower profits are more difficult to read 
(they are longer and less readable). Lehavy et al. (2011) 
investigate the effect of the readability of the disclosure 
in 10-K forms, verifying that less clarity is associated 
with greater dispersion, imprecision, and uncertainty in 
analyst forecasts. Miller (2010) studies the effect of the 
complexity of reports on investment transactions and 
associates complex disclosures with low small investor 
activity in the capital market. Lo, Ramos, and Rogo (2017) 
associate low readability of annual reports with earnings 
management practices.
Various authors, such as Li (2008), Miller (2010), 
Lehavy et al. (2011), and Lo et al. (2017), use computerized 
formulas, especially the Gunning-Fog Index, or simply 
the Fog Index (Gunning, 1969), which calculates the 
number of words per sentence and of complex words 
in a text to determine its readability. Others, such as 
Loughran and McDonald (2014), criticize the use of 
computerized readability indices and prefer an own system 
for measuring readability. The SEC (1998) also takes 
a critical stance, recommending caution in the use of 
readability formulas in financial information.
Readability formulas determine how difficult a piece of writing 
is to read. However, you should be aware of a major flaw in 
every readability formula. No formula takes into account the 
content of the document being evaluated. In other words, no 
formula can tell you if you have conveyed the information 
clearly (SEC, 1998, p. 57)
Given these criticisms, in this study the readability 
of Brazilian companies’ Notes is analyzed using various 
complementary methodologies, as will be detailed (items 
3.2.1 and 4.2).
2.4 Explanatory Factors for Note size and 
Variations in Note size 
As mentioned, one of the aims of this study is to 
address the explanatory factors for both the size of Notes 
and for the variations in their size after OCPC 07.
It is to be assumed that, in normal conditions, Note 
size is a proxy for the level of disclosure (that is, more 
transparent firms would tend to have longer Notes). Thus, 
it is assumed that the same factors traditionally associated 
with greater disclosure would also act in influencing Note 
size. However, the generalized criticisms of excessive 
Note size, which creates obscurity, lead it to be expected 
that the same factors that positively affect Note size also 
influence their downsizing. Thus, if longer Notes do not 
necessarily indicate greater transparency, in the reduction 
of Notes, in order to gain transparency, the same factors 
that encourage disclosure would come into play. 
The literature indicates a positive association between 
disclosure and various main factors: company size 
(Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Santos et al., 2014b; 
Street & Gray, 2002; Zarzeski, 1996), the adoption of 
differentiated governance policies (Santos et al., 2014b, 
2014a), being audited by global auditing firms – Big Four 
(Santos et al., 2014b; Street & Gray, 2002), and having an 
international listing, especially on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) in the form of American depositary 
receipts (ADRs) (Archambault & Archambault, 2003; 
Leuz & Wysocky, 2016; Street & Bryant, 2000). 
In this study, these factors are taken as control variables 
to explain the Note size and its variation after OCPC 07.
As well as these, this study examines two additional 
explanatory factors:
1. Belonging to a highly regulated sector. It is supposed 
that companies belonging to highly regulated sectors 
(oil and gas, electrical energy, and telecommunications) 
face disclosure requirements by multiple regulators, 
which would lead to longer Notes and tend to restrict 
any downsizing of Notes resulting from OCPC 07 [see, 
for example, Santos et al. (2014a)].
2. The size of the company’s Notes in the year before 
OCPC 07 was issued. It is supposed that the longer the 
Notes before OCPC 07, the greater the likelihood of 
them being downsized, since the opportunity for and 
benefits of a reduction are greater, including reduced 
publication costs. Thus, companies with longer Notes 
in the year before OCPC 07 are expected to present a 
greater reduction in their Notes when it comes into 
effect. 
3. METHODOLOGY
This study uses three complementary methodological 
approaches, aiming to (i) analyze the evolution of Note size 
with OCPC 07 and the factors explaining that size and its 
variation; (ii) examine indicators of readability, concision, 
and specificity of the note on accounting policies; and (iii) 
compare the size of Brazilian and British companies’ Notes. 
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3.1 Methodology for Analyzing the Evolution of 
Note size and Explanatory Factors
3.1.1 Sample and data
The analysis of Note size before and after OCPC 07 is 
carried out by taking the Notes of all the non-financial 
firms listed in the B3 in 2010 (year of IFRS adoption), 
2013 (year immediately before OCPC 07 adoption), and 
2014 and 2015 (first and second years OCPC 07 was in 
effect). The year of 2010 is included to distinguish possible 
variations in Note size associated with the learning curve 
since IFRS adoption (2013 vs. 2010) from the variations 
attributable to the adoption of OCPC 07 (2014 vs. 2015 
vs. 2013). Two proxies are used for Note size: the number 
of words and the number of pages.
The Note files on PDF were collected from the Brazilian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) website, 
in the Standardized Financial Statements section. To 
measure the number of words and the number of pages, 
the WordCount software was used.
After eliminating those companies whose Notes 
for the period were not available and those whose files 
were in image format, making counting impossible, the 
sample totaled 314 companies for the 2010, 2013, and 
2014 financial years and 304 companies for the 2015 
financial year. 
The list of companies, their sectors, and the value 
of their assets were obtained from the Economatica® 
database; the roll of the companies listed in special 
governance sections was collected from the B3 website; 
the name of the auditing company was taken from the 
Reference Form, on the CVM website; and the list of firms 
issuing ADRs on the NYSE was extracted from the Bank 
of New York website (www.adrbny.com).
3.1.2 Modeling and analysis of the factors explaining 
Note size and its variance
The analysis of the impact of OCPC 07 on Note size 
is carried out using descriptive statistics and the mean 
difference t test (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated 
that the data follow a normal distribution). To analyze the 
factors that determine Note size, as well as its variation 
with the introduction of OCPC 07, the commonly tested 
variables mentioned are examined as explanatory factors 
of disclosure levels.
The statistical analysis indicated similar results both 
for the number of words and for the number of pages; 
therefore, for concision, in the analysis of the explanatory 
factors, only the results using the number of words as a 
proxy for size are presented. 
After a bivariate analysis of each explanatory variable, 
the following regression model was reached, as shown 
in equation 1:
in which SIZEEN is the size of the note, measured by 
the number of words, SIZE is the size of the company, 
measured by the Neperian logarithm of its total assets, 
S_EE is the electrical energy sector, after the bivariate 
tests indicated that the firms from the electrical energy 
sector behaved differently from those from the other 
regulated sectors (this sector was introduced in the 
regression model as a binary variable: 1 if the company 
is from the electrical energy sector, and 0 otherwise), 
GOV is the corporate governance, a listing in one of the 
special corporate governance segments of the B3 (after 
the bivariate tests indicated different behavior per level of 
listing, each special level of listing – N1, N2, and N3 – was 
tested separately as a binary variable: 1 if the company 
belongs to each one of the special corporate governance 
segments, and 0 otherwise), BIG4 is the auditing firm, 
indicating whether the company is audited by a Big Four 
firm (after the bivariate tests indicated different behavior 
for some auditing firms, each one is analyzed separately: 
1 if the company is audited by a specific Big Four firm, 
and 0 otherwise), ADR is the company issuing ADRs on 
the NYSE, indicating whether the company has ADRs 
listed on the NYSE or not (1 if the company is an ADR 
issuer listed on the NYSE, and 0 otherwise), and YEAR 
is the year, a binary variable inserted to capture the effect 
of each year OCPC 07 is in effect (1 for each year OCPC 
07 is in effect – 2014 or 2015 – and 0 otherwise).
In this event study (the introduction of OCPC 07), 
it is important to identify possible differences in the 
behavior of the explanatory variables in the year before 
the event and in each year it applies, which implies the 
convenience of a cross-sectional regression. Standard tests 
for regression analysis using the Stata software confirmed 
the adequacy of the model.
The explanatory factors for the “variation” in Note size, 
both in the year of OCPC 07 adoption and after it being in 
effect for two years, were studied using bivariate analysis. 
The same explanatory variables for Note size were taken 
and the variable for Note size in the year immediately 
before OCPC 07 (2013) was added.
3.2 Methodology for Analyzing the Note on 
Accounting Policies
A more in-depth analysis focuses on the effect of OCPC 
07 specifically on the note on accounting policies, which 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�� =  𝛽𝛽� +  𝛽𝛽�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +  𝛽𝛽� 𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +  𝛽𝛽� 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 +  𝛽𝛽� 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺4 +  𝛽𝛽� 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 +  𝛽𝛽� 𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 +  𝜀𝜀 1 
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has been the biggest target of criticism, given the practice of 
copy-pasting. For this (after verifying an average reduction 
of 10% in Note size), those companies were taken whose 
Notes reduced in size by at least 20% in the first year OCPC 
07 was in effect, measured both in terms of words and in 
number of pages, encompassing 62 firms. The size of the 
note on accounting policies was calculated, along with the 
proportion between the size of the note and the total for 
the company’s Notes, and the indices for readability and 
similarity of the note with the auditor’s template. 
3.2.1 Measuring the readability index
Besides the readability indices discussed in the 
previous section, the readability of the text is analyzed 
here using three complementary metrics. 
The Fog Index (equation 2) assumes that the text will 
be harder to read the greater the number of words per 
sentence and the greater the use of complex words, defined 
as words that contain three or more syllables (Gunning, 
1969). However, although in the English language words 
with three or more syllables can be considered complex, it 
is hard to say the same for the Portuguese language [see, 
for example, Martins, Ghiraldelo, Nunes, and Oliveira 
(1996)]. Therefore, to enhance the robustness of the 
results, the average length of the sentences (number of 
words divided by the number of sentences) and the average 
length of the paragraphs (number of words divided by 
the number of paragraphs) are calculated. The data 
for calculating these indices were obtained using the 
Character Count tool (https://charactercounttool.com).
3.2.2 Measuring the index of similarity with the 
auditor’s model note 
The similarity index measures whether OCPC 07 leads 
to an improvement in the frequent and widely criticized 
practice of copy-pasting. This practice makes the note 
on accounting policies a mere literal copy of the text 
on the norm, instead to describing the company’s real 
accounting policies. For this, a fictitious EN template 
is used, made available by the main auditing firms to 
guide clients in preparing their own Notes. Despite this 
availability being commendable, many companies limit 
themselves to literally replicating the template. 
The index for the similarity of the note on accounting 
policies with the auditor’s template is calculated using 
the Plagius software, which measures the percentage 
of plagiarism (similarity) of the text in relation to texts 
indicated as a base. It is assumed that the greater the 
percentage of similarity of the note on accounting policies 
in relation to the auditor’s model note, the more generic 
and less informative the company’s note tends to be.
For the analysis, the subsample of 62 companies was 
limited to only those audited by one of the Big Four and 
that did not change auditor between 2013 and 2014, 
totaling a final sample of 44 samples. The analysis is 
carried out by tests of difference between the means of 
the similarity indices for 2013 (before OCPC 07) and 
2014 (first report under OCPC 07).
3.3 Methodology for Comparing Brazilian 
versus British Notes’ size
To complement the analysis, for illustrative purposes 
only, this study compares the size of Brazilian and British 
Notes in 2015 (after two years of OCPC 07 being in effect). 
The aim is to verify whether the adjustments in the Notes 
carried out by the Brazilian companies after OCPC 07 
were enough to make their size similar to those of British 
companies, considered a benchmark for characteristics 
incentivizing transparency: the common law legal-
accounting tradition, a high degree of institutional 
enforcement, and the economic incentives of a highly 
developed capital market. 
For greater comparability, the following procedures 
were adopted:
 ● All the non-financial companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange and in the B3 in 2015 were identified, 
using the Bloomberg database. 
 ● The companies of the two countries with less than 
US$ 500 million in total assets were eliminated 
(companies’ total assets are captured from Bloomberg 
in US dollars). 
 ● As the British capital market is bigger and more 
diversified than the Brazilian one, companies belonging 
to the sectors that are not present in the Brazilian stock 
exchange were eliminated from the sample of British 
ones (Bloomberg GIGS sector classification).
 ● The Brazilian companies’ Notes and the Annual Report 
of the British companies were collected from the 
websites, respectively, of the CVM and the company. 
For the British companies, the other reports were 
excluded from the Annual Report so that only the 
Notes remained. After converting the Notes to Word, in 
order to enable the analysis, those files that presented 
a conversion error were excluded. The final sample 
totaled 106 Brazilian companies and 176 British 
companies, from eight sectors. 
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The analysis is carried out using descriptive statistics 
of the number of pages and a difference of means test.
It is worth noting that the belief that texts in 
Portuguese would be longer than their counterparts in 
English is not backed in current computer supported 
studies. According to Frankenberg-Garcia (2002, 
2014), an analysis by the system Compara of a two-
directional English-Portuguese corpus (a computerized 
set of numerous texts and their English-Portuguese 
translations and vice-versa) shows no scientific evidence 
for this belief:
The conventional wisdom is that Portuguese is generally more 
wordy than English, and that Portuguese translations tend to be 
longer than their corresponding English source texts, while English 
translations tend to be shorter than Portuguese source texts. This 
language-dependent bias is at odds with a more general theory 
of universals of translation (Frankenberg-Garcia, 2002, p. 5);
and further:
when translating from English to Portuguese, provided that 
there are no major changes in content, it is unlikely that word 
counts will increase in the process […] Thus […] one cannot 
say that translation will expand the text. (Frankenberg-Garcia, 
2014, p. 162-163)
4. RESULTS
The results are structured in three sections: (1) 
evolution of Note size after OCPC 07 and explanatory 
factors for Note size and its reduction; (2) analysis of 
size and indices of readability and similarity with the 
auditor’s template in the note on accounting policies; and 
(3) comparison of the Notes from 2015: Brazilian versus 
British companies.
4.1 Evolution of Note size in Brazil after OCPC 
07 and Explanatory Factors
4.1.1 Note size before and after OCPC 07
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics 
for the size of the companies’ Notes measured both by the 
number of words and by the number of pages in the year 
of IFRS adoption (2010), in the year immediately before 
OCPC 07 came into effect (2013), in its first year in effect 
(2014), and two years after it had been in effect (2015).
The test for possible variations in Note size attributable 
to the learning curve since IFRS adoption (2010 vs. 
2013) reveals: (i) from the number of words, there was 
no statistically significant variation in size: 50% of the 
companies presented longer Notes, while the other half 
had shorter Notes; (ii) the number of pages shows a slight 
fall of around 6% (from 61 pages in 2010 to 57 in 2013), 
significant at 5%, with 65% of the Notes in 2013 having 
at least one page less than in 2010. However, the apparent 
reduction in the number of pages from 2010 to 2013 
must be taken with caution for two main reasons: (i) the 
simple exclusion of the Initial Adoption of IFRS note, 
present in 2010 and not applicable in the other years, 
would already lead to a natural fall in Note size (in AES 
Eletropaulo, for example, this note accounted for 4,521 
of the 41,061 words – 11% – and 14 of the 119 pages); (ii) 
the variation in the number of pages may derive from the 
differences in the configuration of the text or the tables 
and fonts used, since the number of pages decreased by 
an average of 6%, without altering the number of pages.
These results suggest that the learning curve, three 
years after IFRS adoption in Brazil, does not appear to 
have acted in reducing the companies’ Notes, which 
highlights the opportunity OCPC 07 created as a stimulus 
for downsizing Notes in Brazil.
Comparing Note size in 2013 with that of the period 
OCPC 07 was in effect, a slight reduction is perceived, in 
the order of 7% in the first year and 10% after it was in 
effect for two years (both significant at 1%), independent 
of whether measuring by the number of words or by the 
number of pages. After two years of it being in effect, 
more than 60% of the companies reduced the size of their 
Notes, both in number of words and pages, by at least 
10% in more than 40% of the companies. The degree of 
reduction increased from the first to the second year of 
OCPC 07 being in effect, indicating that the downsizing 
of the Notes was not an isolated event, restricted to the 
year the guideline was adopted, but that it had continuity 
and became generalized in the second year of it being 
in effect: the reduction of at least 10% in the number of 
words occurred in 29% of the companies from 2013 to 
2014 and in 41% of the companies from 2013 to 2015; the 
tendency is similar with regards to the number of pages.
Thus, assuming the perception that the Notes were 
inflated, the results suggest that the introduction of OCPC 
07 had some effectiveness, even though limited, in terms 
of their downsizing, since the reduction of 6-7% in the first 
year and 9-10% after two years cannot be attributed to the 
simple effect of the learning curve since IFRS adoption. 
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4.1.2 Explanatory factors for Note size before and after 
OCPC 07
Firstly, t tests for means were carried out for each 
binary variable with explanatory potential for Note size 
(not presented here for concision). The results show that, 
taken in isolation (bivariate analysis), practically all the 
variables analyzed have a positive association with Note 
size. 
Table 2 presents the results of the multiple regression 
model described in equation 1 and used to identify the 
explanatory factors for Note size (number of words) each 
year, as well as using the triplicate base of the three years, 
with the first year and second year OCPC 07 was in effect 
serving as dummy variables. The regression model is 
significant at 1% and strong, explaining more than 60% 
of the differences in size between the Notes. 
The results show a negative relationship between the 
years OCPC 07 was in effect and Note size (at the 5% level 
of significance for the first year and 1% for the second 
year). Confirming the difference of means tests, the years 
OCPC 07 was in effect are associated with shorter Notes, 
suggesting that the new guideline caused a reduction in 
Note size. 
In terms of corporate governance, only the variable 
for being listed in the Novo Mercado (NM) segment 
is significant (1%) for explaining Note size in the 
four models; being listed in Nivel 1 (Level 1) was not 
significant in any of the years analyzed in isolation. 
These results suggest that the higher the level of the 
company’s corporate governance, the longer its Notes 
will tend to be.
It is observed that the variables company size (Total 
Assets), internationalization (ADRs), and economic 
sector (Energy Sector) have a positive and significant 
(at 1%) association with the size of the companies’ Notes, 
confirming that bigger companies from the regulated 
electrical energy sector and issuers of ADRs on the NYSE 
tend to have longer Notes.
Table 1
Evolution of Notes size 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Number of words Number of pages
2010 2013 2014 2015 2010 2013 2014 2015
Mean 16,729 17,218 16,167 15,705 61 57 53 52
Median 16,512 16,766 15,608 15,194 60 54 50 50
Minimum 969 505 491 89 4 2 2 3
Maximum 63,425 67,131 66,233 64,378 235 191 223 206
Panel B: Variation in size
2013/ 2010 2014/ 2013 2015/ 2013 2013/2010 2014/2013 2015/2013
Variation in mean 1.03 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.90
Shorter Notes 49% 65% 61% 65% 57% 63%
Same-sized Notes - - - - 10% 8%
Longer Notes 51% 35% 39% 35% 33% 30%
Reduction >= 20% 14% 13% 22% 13% 16% 26%
Reduction >= 10% 31% 29% 41% 29% 37% 47%
Increase >= 10% 38% 17% 21% 17% 17% 19%
Increase >= 20% 27% 8% 11% 8% 7% 13%
Panel C: Test for mean (t test) *** *** ** *** ***
*, **, *** = levels of significance of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Table 2
Regression analysis – Explanatory factors for Notes size
Variables Expectation
Coefficients (significance)
2013 2014 2015 All years
Total assets
+ 1,558*** 1,613*** 1,526*** 1,563***
(10.83) (11.43) (11.66) (19.49)
Energy sector
+ 5,307*** 6,299*** 6,468*** 5,944***
(4.45) (5.54) (6.11) (9.13)
NM
+ 5,280*** 3,284*** 3,285*** 3,974***
(5.25) (3.48) (3.79) (7.32)
N2
+ 5,613*** 3,048 3,853** 4,305***
(2.77) (1.59) (2.24) (3.95)
N1
+ 2,714 1,292 1,773 1,976**
(1.64) (0.82) (1.25) (2.21)
Aud 1
+ 5,405*** 2,099* 1,567 3,147***
(4.33) (1.71) (1.37) (4.52)
Aud 2
+ 4,672*** 3,624*** 3,429*** 3,907***
(4.06) (3.29) (3.06) (6.04)
Aud 3
+ 6,304*** 4,248*** 3,197*** 4,441***
(4.53) (3.39) (3.07) (6.32)
Aud 4
+ 2,490* 2,511** 2,840** 2,635***
(1.84) (1.98) (2.49) (3.64)
ADRs
+ 9,840*** 10,100*** 10,603*** 10,110***








-10,867*** -10,956*** -10,162*** -9,961***
(-6.02) (-6.28) (-6.34) (-9.37)
R2 a 63.8% 62.4% 66.8% 64.3%
F test 56.15*** 52.99*** 62.09*** 140.67***
N 314 314 304 932
Notes: the results of the t test are in parentheses. 
2014 and 2015: 1 if the data refer to each year Accounting Pronouncements Committee Guideline 07 (OCPC 07) was in effect 
and 0 otherwise; ADRs (American depositary receipts) = 1 if the company has ADRs listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and 0 otherwise; total assets = Naparian logarithm of total assets; Aud 1, 2, 3, and 4 = 1 if the company is audited by 
each specific Big Four and 0 otherwise; Energy sector = 1 if the company belongs to the electrical energy sector and 0 otherwise; 
N1: 1 if the company is listed in level 1 corporate governance of the B3 and 0 otherwise; N2: 1 if the company is listed in level 2 
corporate governance of the B3 and 0 otherwise; NM = 1 if the company is listed in the Novo Mercado of the B3 and 0 otherwise.
*, **, *** = levels of significance of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Concerning the effect of the auditing company, the 
results indicate that there is a significant association 
(at 1%) between being audited by Big Fours n. 2 and n. 
3 (for exemption, the names of the auditors were omitted) 
and having longer Notes. The association between being 
audited by Big Fours n. 1 or n. 4 and Note size cannot 
be established with as much certainty. For Big Four n. 1, 
both the explanatory power and its statistical significance 
fall progressively with OCPC 07 being in effect, but the 
opposite movement is perceived in relation to being 
audited by auditor n. 4. These results suggest that not all 
the Big Four appear to have the same power of influence 
over the companies they audit in terms of the downsizing 
of their Notes promoted by OCPC 07.
4.1.3 Explanatory factors for the variation in Note size 
after OCPC 07
Regarding the results of the tests of the explanatory 
variables for the variation in Note size after OCPC 07, 
Table 3 shows the correlation tests for the continuous 
variables and Table 4 shows the difference of means t 
tests for the binary variables. 
The results in Table 3 indicate a negative significant 
correlation between the company’s size and the index 
for the variation in Note size (before/after OCPC 07); 
this correlation rises from 10.5% in the first year OCPC 
07 was in effect to 20% after two years. The negative 
correlation with Note size in the year immediately before 
OCPC 07 came into effect is even greater, at around 23% 
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in the first year and around 31% after two years of the 
guideline (both significant at 1%). These results confirm 
the expectation that the longer the company’s Notes in 
the year immediately before OCPC 07 and the bigger the 
company is, the greater the downsizing of its Notes tends 
to be with the new guideline. 
Table 3
Variation in Notes size – Correlation with continuous variables
2013 vs 2014 2013 vs 2015
Company size (NL Assets) -0.105* -0.200***
Number of words in 2013 -0.229*** -0.312***
NL = total asset’s naparian logarithm.
*, **, *** = levels of significance of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The analysis of the qualitative explanatory variables 
(Table 4) shows that the companies that downsized their 
Notes in both periods OCPC 07 was in effect tend to be 
those listed at the highest corporate governance level of 
the B3 (Novo Mercado) and those audited by Big Four n. 
1. Being audited by Big Four n. 3 is also associated with a 
reduction in Note size, but only in the second year OCPC 
07 was in effect. These results confirm the expectation that 
the same governance factors (being listed in the highest 
segment of governance and being audited by a Big Four) 
that tend to work as an incentive for improving disclosure 
would also be associated with the downsizing of inflated 
Notes, promoted by OCPC 07.
Table 4 
Variation in Notes size – t test of the binary variables
Variable Groups
2013 x 2014 2013 x 2015
N Mean N Mean
Governance
Differentiated level
 Yes 144 0.920*** 141 0.908***
No 170 1.029*** 163 1.036***
NM
 Yes 106 0.919*** 103 0.904***
No 208 1.009*** 201 1.014***
N1
 Yes 24 0.941 24 0.922
No 290 0.982 280 0.981
N2
 Yes 14 0.894** 14 0.916
No 300 0.983** 290 0.98
Regulated sector
Regulated sector
 Yes 61 1.031* 59 1.075
No 253 0.966* 245 0.953
Telecomunications
 Yes 13 1.037 12 1.002
No 301 0.976 292 0.976
Electical energy
 Yes 42 1.026 41 1.107
No 272 0.972 263 0.956
Oil and gas
 Yes 6 1.053 6 1.004
No 308 0.978 298 0.976
Auditing firm
Some Big Four
 Yes 212 0.954*** 199 0.940*
No 102 1.031*** 105 1.047*
Aud 1
 Yes 48 0.881*** 45 0.857***
No 266 0.997*** 259 0.997***
Aud 2
 Yes 66 0.965 43 0.974
No 248 0.983 261 0.977
Aud 3
 Yes 49 0.955 62 0.904***
No 265 0.983 242 0.995***
Aud 4
 Yes 49 1.010 49 1,031
No 265 0.973 255 0,966
ADRs on the NYSE
Yes 20 0.968 20 0.960
No 294 0.98 284 0.978
ADR = American Depositary Receipt; NYSE = New York Stock Exchange
*, **, *** = levels of significance of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
An interesting conclusion with regards to Big Four n. 1 
can be found by combining the results from Table 4 with 
those from Table 2. According to Table 4, those companies 
audited by Big Four n. 1 are the ones that most reduced 
the size of their Notes in 2014 (average reduction of 12%), 
with this downsizing process continuing in 2015 (average 
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reduction of 14%); according to Table 2, being audited 
by Big Four n. 1 is a strong indication of longer Notes in 
2013 (before OCPC 07), but the power of this variable in 
explaining longer Notes declines in the years OCPC 07 
was in effect, until losing statistical significance in 2015. 
This suggests that Big Four n. 1 would have caused such 
a reduction in the size of the Notes of the companies 
it audited that, in 2015, being audited by this Big Four 
would no longer indicate longer Notes.
In contrast, the movement towards reducing Note size 
is not associated with the inferior governance segments 
(it was significant at 5% only in 2014 for level 2), nor with 
all the Big Four (there is no significant association with 
Big Four n. 2 nor with n. 4). These results suggest that, 
contrary to what could be expected, not all the Big Four 
appear to have effectively stimulated the downsizing of 
the Notes of the companies they audited. Only one of 
them appears to have carried out a consistent process of 
downsizing Notes in the two years and another only in 
the second year OCPC 07 was in effect.
The variables for having a listing on an international 
stock exchange (ADRs) and belonging to one of the 
regulated sectors are also not associated with the 
movement of reducing Note size. One possible explanation 
may be the difficulty in carrying out changes in disclosure, 
given the joint regulation of the Brazilian stock exchange 
(CVM) plus the SEC (in the case of issuers of ADRs on 
the NYSE) and other specific agencies (in the case of the 
highly regulated sectors).
4.2 Analysis of the Note on Accounting Policies 
of Companies that most Downsized their 
Notes
Table 5 presents the indicators of size of the note on 
accounting policies of the 62 companies whose Notes were 
reduced by at least 20% in 2014, the year OCPC 07 was 
introduced. An expressive reduction is observed in the 
size of the note, of between 34% and 45%, depending on 
the metric used (number of pages, words, or sentences, 
all significant at 1%).
Table 5 
Size and proportion of the Note on accounting policies after Accounting Pronouncements Committee Guideline 07 (OCPC 07)
Readability index Index of similarity with 
the model noteWords/Sentençe Words/Paragraph Fog Index
2013 2014 2014/2013 2013 2014 2014/2013 2013 2014 2014/2013 2013 2014 2014/2013
Number 62 62 62 62 62 62 44 44
Mean 17 19 1.07 25 27 1.08 7.1 7.6 1.06 54.3% 50.9% 0.94
Median 18 19 1.06 24 27 1.14 7.3 7.7 1.06 50.8% 47.2% 0.93
Minimum 6 7 4 6 2.7 2.8 28.8% 29.1%
Maximum 25 27 54 45 10.3 10.8 82.0% 79.1%
Standard 
deviation




50% 48% 50% 61%
Test for mean ** * ** *
*, **, *** = levels of significance of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
It is observed that there was practically no alteration 
in the size of this note in relation to the Notes as a whole: 
the note occupied, on average, 28% of the size (number 
of words) of the Notes in the two years. These results 
suggest that the reduction in size of the Notes in the 
first year OCPC 07 was in effect appears to have been 
generalized for all Notes, with no special focus on the 
note on accounting policies. 
The readability indices (Table 6) measure whether, 
by reducing the size of the note on accounting policies, 
the company also made it more readable. The results, 
according to the three readability metrics used (average 
length of sentences, average length of paragraphs, and Fog 
Index), are consistent in defying expectations, indicating a 
deterioration in the readability indicators, with an average 
increase in the order of 6 to 8%. Some improvement is 
noted, however, in the readability indices for this note in 
half of the companies.
The combination of an average fall of 45% in the 
number of sentences (Table 5) with an average increase 
of 7% in the length of the sentences (Table 6) suggests that, 
in order to reduce the size of the Notes, the companies 
appear to have engaged in eliminating whole sentences 
and/or reducing breaks in sentences, ultimately making 
them longer. Thus, by neglecting the task of making the 
sentences more concise and readable, they ended up with 
more difficult to read Notes. 
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Table 6 
Indices of readability and of similarity with the model note
Size of the note on accounting policies Proportion of the total for the 
Notes (percentage of words)Number of words Number of pages Number of sentences
2013 2014 2014/2013 2013 2014 2014/2013 2013 2014 2014/2013 2013 2014 2014/2013
Number 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Mean 15 9 0.62 5,204 3,451 0.66 331 183 0.93 28% 28% 0.99
Median 14 9 0.64 5,550 3,174 0.57 254 185 0.87 28% 26% 0.94
Minimum 1 1 198 208 16 13 5% 7%
Maximum 43 25 11,440 8,782 1,620 622 54% 123%
Standard 
deviation





77% 84% 79% 53%
Test for mean ** * ** *
Note: Only Notes on accounting policies. Only companies that maintained their auditor and for which it was possible to 
calculate the similarity index using the Farejador software.
*, **, *** = levels of significance of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Data on companies that reduced by 20% in 2014.
According to Table 6, the similarity of the company’s 
EN in relation to the auditor’s model note appears to 
remain constant or fall slightly, from 54.3% in 2013 to 
50.9% in 2014 (10% significance), suggesting an almost 
unperceivable improvement in this indicator. However, 
61% of the companies in the subsample achieved some 
reduction in the similarity index for their note on 
accounting policies in relation to the auditor’s model note. 
The results suggest little effectiveness of OCPC 07 
in reducing the undesirable and common practice of 
copy-pasting texts of the norm or the auditor’s template, 
since, on average, 51% of the note on accounting policies 
still consists of such texts, thus opposing the guideline of 
OCPC 07 that “in the Notes on the basis for elaborating the 
financial statements and the specific accounting policies 
of the entity the texts of the normative acts should not 
be repeated” (OCPC 07, item 30). Thus, the Brazilian 
companies still appear resistant to only communicating 
their real accounting practices and policies in the effective 
interest of the user.
4.3 Comparison of Note size in Brazil versus in 
the United Kingdom
The reduction in Note size after OCPC 07 leads to a 
complementary question: was this reduction enough to 
put the Notes of Brazilian companies at the same size level 
as British ones, a benchmark for transparency?
Table 7 
Footnote size in 2015: Brazil vs. United Kingdom
Brazil United Kingdom Brazil/United Kingdom
Number 106 176 0.6
Pages
Mean 75 54 1.4
Median 68 51 1.3
Minimum 29 10 2.9
Maximum 206 162 1.3
Standard deviation 29 22
t test 0.00%
Assets (US$ 1,000,000)
Mean 7,527 9,911 0.8
Median 2,093 2,494 0.8
Minimum 510 525 1.0
Maximum 227,261 261,832 0.9
Standard deviation 23,892 27,167
t test 22.1%
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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According to Table 7, even after the downsizing 
promoted by OCPC 07, the Brazilian companies’ Notes are 
still on average 40% longer (contrary to expectations for 
an equivalent number of pages) than those of the British 
firms (at 1% significance) of equivalent size and sectors 
(mean difference tests indicate that there is no significant 
difference in size between the samples of Brazilian and 
British companies).
5. CONCLUSION
This study analyzes the impact of OCPC 07 on 
improving formal aspects (size, readability, and specificity) 
of Brazilian companies’ Notes via six questions: (1) Was 
there a reduction in Note size promoted by OCPC 07? (2) 
If so, what factors would explain the size and (3) variation 
in size of the Notes? (4) Was there an improvement in 
the readability of the text? (5) Was there a decrease 
in the practice of copy-pasting texts from the norm 
with an increase in content specific to the company’s 
reality? (6) Two years after OCPC 07 came into effect, 
had the Notes of Brazilian companies (of the civil law 
legal-accounting culture) reached a similar size to those 
of British companies, considered a benchmark of the 
common law tradition?
The answer to the first question is affirmative: an 
analysis of all non-financial companies listed in the B3 
shows a small, but progressive reduction in Note size, 
with an average fall of around 10% two years after OCPC 
07 came into effect.
The analysis of the explanatory factors confirms 
that the size of the Notes can be considered a proxy 
for the companies’ level of disclosure, explained by the 
same factors normally associated with a greater level of 
disclosure: company size, good corporate governance 
practices, being audited by the Big Four, having ADRs on 
the NYSE, and operating sector (in this case, the electrical 
energy sector). The results also indicate that the positive 
association with Note size is different for each level of 
corporate governance and for each Big Four considered 
individually. In addition, the regression analysis confirms 
the negative association between Note size and the years 
OCPC 07 had been in effect, supporting the expectation 
of a reduction in Note size as a result of the new guideline.
However, in light of the current finding of inflated 
Notes, with a loss of information amid irrelevant 
content, it would be expected that, in the movement 
towards reducing Notes to gain transparency, the same 
factors that incentivize disclosure would come into play. 
Nonetheless, not all the variables that normally promote 
disclosure were corroborated as explanatory factors for 
a reduction in Notes. In fact, the results indicate that 
the bigger the company and the longer the Notes in the 
year immediately before OCPC 07 came into effect, the 
greater the reduction in Notes when it was in effect. Yet, 
this reduction is only observed among companies at the 
highest level of governance (Novo Mercado) and among 
those audited by Big Four n. 1 (in both years) and Big 
Four n. 3 (in 2015 only).
These results reveal that there is much more room for 
downsizing NEs, especially among smaller companies, 
those not listed or listed in inferior corporate governance 
segments of the B3, those audited by Big Fours n. 2 
and n. 4, and those not audited by the Big Four. They 
also show the opportunity for downsizing the Notes of 
electrical energy companies and issuers of ADRs on the 
NYSE, even when faced with joint regulation [besides 
the CVM, of the SEC for ADRs and of the National 
Electrical Energy Agency (Aneel) for electrical energy 
companies].
The analysis of the note on accounting policies of 
the companies that reduced the size of their Notes by at 
least 20% reveals that the reduction did not result in an 
improvement in the readability indicators, but there was 
a small deterioration. These results suggest that, in the 
process of reducing their Notes, the companies appear to 
have eliminated entire sentences and/or sentences breaks, 
neglecting the task of making the sentences more concise 
and readable. The analysis of the index for the similarity 
of the text of this note with the template divulged by the 
auditor indicates that the undesirable practice of copy-
pasting had at least a small improvement: the average for 
the similarity index fell by only 6%, falling from 54.3% 
literal reproduction of the template in 2013 to 50.9% in 
2014, at a level of significance of only 10%. Thus, OCPC 
07 appears to have had little effectiveness in facilitating 
the readability of the Notes and in focusing on the real 
policies adopted by the company.
The comparison between the size of the Notes of the 
Brazilian and British companies showed that, despite the 
reduction, two years after OCPC 07 had been in place, the 
Notes of the Brazilian companies were still, on average, 
40% longer than those of that benchmark.
The results of this study give rise to implications for 
research on disclosure, as they indicate that by reducing 
inflated Notes, some of the same factors that promote 
transparency studied in the literature come into play. 
They also suggest that the introduction of a standard has 
effectiveness, although limited, in transforming habits 
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rooted in the civil law legal-accounting tradition that 
hardly incentivizes transparency. Thus, the results give 
rise to implications for regulators, in that they suggest 
the need to adopt complementary actions – in the form 
of incentives and stronger enforcement – to promote 
transparency in the Brazilian market. They also give rise 
to implications for companies and market analysts, by 
indicating that there is still room for improving Notes in 
terms of size, specificity, and readability, with the aim of 
improving the understanding of them and enjoying the 
benefits of increased transparency.
It should be stressed that the results of this study ought 
to be taken with caution, since the effects of OCPC 07 on 
the quality of the content disclosed were not analyzed, and 
indicators of the form of disclosure should be considered, 
thus leaving space for subsequent research. 
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